中國評論﹕南海混亂恩怨情仇

【明報專訊】南海的緊張局勢中，美國的角色一直受人注目，一般都認為，越南、菲律賓連番挑釁的背後，是美國在背後支持，但這只是傳統的「冷戰思維」。到目前為止，除了駐菲大使說了幾句含糊其辭的話外，只有國務院反對越南軍演的聲明。至於國會議員和輿論的口水，不聽也罷。

中國外交連串微調

美國態度的這種微妙變化，背後的真正原因暫未清楚。不過，中國外交最近的連串微調似也有舻可尋，首先在利比亞問題上，中國的態度有所鬆動，繼駐埃及使館官員與利國反對派陣營首度公開接觸後，外交部更公開表態歡迎利國反對派代表訪問北京，聯合國安理會今日開會，討論利比亞局勢，中國罕有地派副外長翟雋專程出席，其表態引人注目；與此同時，以色列國防部長時隔10年首度訪華，亦引起國際輿論關注。特別是內地媒體引述以色列防長對以巴衝突的標題「人不犯我，我不犯人」，更是以色列近年在內地輿論中少有的正面形象；國家主席胡錦濤日前在上海合作組織峰會中會見伊朗總統時，也奉勸其加快與西方國家的對話。

歐美與中方做交易

中國外交的這種微調，雖多少有因北非茉莉花革命、拉登被殺後的政策調整成分，但肯定也是一種妥協的交易。中俄兩國雖然阻擋不了北約空襲利比亞，但卻可能是逼走卡達菲的最後國際因素；中國或許無力斡旋以巴衝突，但卻能在牽制伊朗方面扮演關鍵角色。而這一切，歐美國家都不可能不與中方在某些方面做交易。這個交易的籌碼，也許正是南海。

說回南海，爭議各方中，大馬和印尼都作壁上觀，中方表態空前溫和；菲越兩個狠角色中，前者也許算美國舊友，後者只能是個賣身投靠的「新歡」，美國難為她兩肋插刀，傳統上中國才是越南最大「靠山」；這種混亂的恩怨情仇，令各方的應對都十分謹慎小心。

孫嘉業

Russo-Japanese Relations at their Lowest Ebb since the Cold War

http://www.rusi.org/analysis/commentary/ref:C4D64F3D7C92AC/

Russo-Japanese bilateral relations appear to be at an all-time low. Terse and public diplomatic exchanges between Tokyo and Moscow have followed Russian promises to build up their military strength in the Russian Far East. The immediate cause of tension is the disputed Kuril Islands (or Northern Territories as they’re known in Japan), seized from Japan by Stalin in the fading days of the Second World War – preventing the two states from signing a formal peace treaty. The Soviet Union settled ethnic Russians on to the four islands off the coast of Japan’s northernmost island, Hokkaido, following the eviction of Japanese civilians in 1945, and the new inhabitants continue to fish the same waters as their Japanese predecessors. As the territorial dispute stretches back nearly sixty-six years, why has it recently taken on new life, and what is the true significance of the current Russo-Japanese falling-out?

Old Problem, New Dynamic

In many ways, the answers lie in the changes that have swept over the region during the twenty years since the fall of the Soviet Union, and in the shift in perceptions that has taken place between Russia and Japan over that time. In the 1990s, the cash-starved Russian Federation looked to Japan for investment, technology and partnership in its energy projects in the region. Its willingness to try to reach some compromise over the issue was pushed by those in Moscow who saw real dividends in trying to reach some compromise with Tokyo over the Islands. In 1998, Boris Yeltsin was promised a $1.5 billion aid package from Japan and the IMF, and while both sides dismissed any link with the territorial dispute, Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi visited Moscow that same year to try to negotiate a deal with Yeltsin. On top of that, Japanese financing – totalling some $3.7billion – has flowed into Russian energy projects from the Japanese Bank of International Cooperation, Mitsui and the Mitsubishi Corporation.

Now, Moscow no longer sees dividends in trying to reach a compromise with Tokyo. Indeed, it reckons that it can gain more by taking a hard line on the issue: building up its military forces there[1] and sending a revolving-door of politicians from Moscow has been met with approval amongst more right-wing members of the Russian electorate and the conservative elements of the military. With next year’s elections in mind, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev’s December visit to the islands – the first by a Russian leader – was also calibrated to appeal to nationalist sentiment and to reassure Russian security fears in the Far East. Sporting a bomber jacket (in Putin mode), Medvedev talked tough on Japanese claims, and promised aid and development money to local Russian leaders. Furthermore, a spat with Japan, coming so soon after China’s own territorial-driven fishing boat incident in September, puts Moscow in Beijing’s good books. Russia knows that it can play these games without paying a political price, safe in the knowledge that Tokyo has little recourse and can always be brought back to the table later.

Tokyo’s Woes

If Russia has grown stronger, then the corollary is equally true. Tokyo is in a far weaker position than it was two decades ago. Its economy has been in the doldrums for more than a decade, with the Chinese juggernaut brushing past earlier this year. While it remains one of the largest global creditors, huge deficit problems have lead to a loss in creditworthiness. Politically, it has endured a large number of leadership changes, churning through five Prime Ministers in five years, and impairing its ability to get a serious grasp on long-term policy issues like security and the economy. Last week, as Prime Minister Kan’s cabinet struggled to formulate answers to Japan’s economic woes, it also had to deal with a sideline leadership battle which saw sixteen lawmakers – affiliated with a rogue member of the Democratic Party of Japan, Ichiro Ozawa – challenge the Prime Minister’s leadership and threaten to impair his ability to pass legislation. Finally, Japan’s relationship with its security guarantor, the US, has been on less-than-sure footing since former Prime Minister Hatoyama threatened to scupper a base-relocation agreement in Okinawa. While his mishandling of the issue (among others) ultimately caused the Japanese electorate to lose confidence in his leadership, the Futenma Base issue strengthened the Russian perception of an isolated Japan.

Whether the diplomatic furore around the Kuril Island/Northern Territories continues past the Russian elections next year depends on whether Moscow is serious about building up its Far East military command, currently in serious disrepair. Promises to allocate S400 SAM systems, a Mistral assault vessel and a modern fighter wing have followed the resumption of Russian bomber patrols. As the Asian Pacific develops into one of the biggest drivers of the global economy, it is not surprising that Russia begins to re-orient itself to this source of economic growth. Its relationships with the US, NATO and the EU are fairly stable at present, meaning that it can afford to focus less on its western borders. If, however, Russia does continue to militarize the islands further, it could elicit a Japanese response two or three years down the line. Ultimately, Russia retains the strong cards in this particular game: Moscow knows that it can either demilitarize the islands or invite Chinese investment as a way of applying leverage on Tokyo. And, given Japan’s current malaise, Tokyo might just have to pay.

Notes

[1] Interfax-AVN news agency claimed that it had been told by a ‘high-ranking representative of the Russian General Staff’ that Russia would deploy its newest S-400 Air Defence SAMs to the Kurils.

中國評論﹕中越在南海打不起來

【明報專訊】最近的南海局勢似乎劍拔弩張，有關中越難免一戰的言論充斥內地網上論壇。但冷靜分析中越兩國國力和海軍實力，就看得出對比懸殊，這場仗很難打得起來，即使中國要教訓越南，辦法也很多。

說中越國力懸殊，可以廣西作對比，廣西人口5000萬，面積24萬平方公里，去年GDP1460億美元（9502億元人民幣）；越南8700萬人 口，面積33萬平方公里，去年GDP1046億美元。中越的差距還在經濟的體質上，越南外債290億美元，外匯儲備136億美元，去年財赤為120億美 元。中國去年外債餘額為5489.38億美元，財赤1619億美元（1.05萬億人民幣），但外儲已高達3萬億美元。兩者實力差距不是一個數量級的。至於 軍事實力，中國一個南海艦隊的實力已遠高於整個越南海軍的實力，這種仗不用打已分出勝負。

越南叫囂 圖緩解國內矛盾

特別是越南去年以來經濟急劇惡化，上月通脹率已升近20%，是全球通脹升幅最高5個國家之一。首季的220宗罷工事件，已多過去年全年的216宗。5月初西北部還發生了大規模的苗族騷亂，雖被鎮壓，但越共的統治已現危機四伏。

值得注意的是，越南最近在南海的叫囂，正是由於其國內經濟狀況惡化，政經危機湧現，所以一要覬覦南海的石油，二想借此轉移國內民眾視線，煽動民族情 緒，以圖緩解國內矛盾。中共對越共的困境了然於胸，因此對越南僅在離岸40公里的火炮射擊演習，僅由外交部作溫和回應，但在南海這塊風水寶地卻寸土不讓。 越南首度在南沙群島萬安灘勘測就踢到鐵板，那艘兩度被剪斷電纜的勘測船，是越南國家石油公司租用的法國船，經過此番折騰，估計短期內難再有外國石油公司敢 與越南合作在南海探油。

孫嘉業